Semantics
Quantifiers in Natural Language
How "every," "most," "few" carve up a domain
Natural language quantifiers — every, some, most, few, all, no, three, many — express how many of a domain a predicate holds for. First-order logic handles every as ∀ and some as ∃, but cannot express most. Generalized Quantifier Theory (Barwise & Cooper 1981) treats quantifiers as relations between sets — most A are B means |A ∩ B| > |A − B|. This captures conservativity, monotonicity, and the typology that runs from logical to cardinal to proportional to vague.
- Foundational paperBarwise & Cooper 1981
- Earlier rootsMostowski 1957, Lindström 1966
- TypeRelation between sets / set of sets
- Universal propertyConservativity
- Polarity diagnosticMonotonicity (NPI licensing)
- Beyond first-ordermost, half, few are inexpressible in FOL
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How quantifiers work
The simplest quantified sentence has three parts: a determiner, a noun (the restrictor), and a predicate (the nuclear scope).
[Every] [student] [passed].
─────── ───────── ────────
determiner restrictor nuclear scope
Generalized Quantifier Theory (GQT) treats the determiner as a function that takes two sets — the restrictor's denotation and the scope's denotation — and returns a truth value. Every takes the set of students S and the set of pass-ers P and returns true iff S ⊆ P. Some returns true iff S ∩ P ≠ ∅. Most returns true iff |S ∩ P| > |S − P|. No returns true iff S ∩ P = ∅.
This uniform treatment is the move. First-order logic could only translate every and some; most required jumping to second-order or to a generalized quantifier. The unification reveals that natural language treats them all the same way grammatically — they all combine determiner-with-noun-with-predicate — and the semantic differences are purely in which set-relation each determiner picks out.
Two universal-ish properties
Conservativity. A determiner Q is conservative iff Q(A, B) ↔ Q(A, A ∩ B). In words: only the A's matter. "Every dog barks" depends only on what dogs do; non-dogs are irrelevant. Every, some, no, most, three, few, many — all conservative. Keenan and Stavi (1986) argue every extensional natural-language determiner is conservative, a striking universal because logically there's no reason it should be.
Monotonicity. A determiner is upward-monotone in its second argument if Q(A, B) and B ⊆ B′ imply Q(A, B′). Downward-monotone if Q(A, B) and B′ ⊆ B imply Q(A, B′). The same applies to the first argument. The monotonicity profile predicts Negative Polarity Item (NPI) licensing: any, ever, lift a finger are grammatical only in downward-entailing environments.
Every [+student] [+walked] → ↓ in arg1, ↑ in arg2
Some [+student] [+walked] → ↑ in arg1, ↑ in arg2
No [+student] [+walked] → ↓ in arg1, ↓ in arg2
Most [+student] [+walked] → non-monotone in arg1, ↑ in arg2
Test: NPI any requires a downward-entailing context.
"Nobody who has any money complained" ✓ (no = ↓ in arg1)
"Somebody who has any money complained" ✗ (some = ↑ in arg1)
Restricted vs unrestricted quantifiers
| Restricted (NL) | Unrestricted (FOL) | |
|---|---|---|
| Domain | Provided by the noun (restrictor) | Whole universe |
| Form | [Det N] VP — "every student passed" | ∀x. (φ(x) → ψ(x)) |
| Type | ⟨⟨e,t⟩, ⟨⟨e,t⟩, t⟩⟩ | ⟨⟨e,t⟩, t⟩ |
| Conservativity | Built in (only restrictor matters) | N/A — no restrictor |
| Most expressible | Yes (Det as set relation) | No (requires second-order) |
| Vague Det (many, few) | Yes | No |
| Cross-linguistic | Universal pattern (Det N + scope) | Logician's normal form |
| Quantifier raising | Generates inverse-scope readings | Scope fixed by formula |
The disconnect is one reason logicians and linguists historically talked past each other. Frege wrote ∀x. (STUDENT(x) → PASSED(x)), folding the restriction into a conditional. Linguists pointed out that most resists this trick: ∀x. (STUDENT(x) → PASSED(x)) means every student passed, but you cannot rewrite "most students passed" as a single first-order formula.
A typology of natural-language Det's
- Logical. every, all, no, some, a/an — definable in first-order logic, isomorphism-invariant, cross-linguistically near-universal.
- Cardinal. three, seven, more than five, fewer than ten, exactly two — count-based, definable with cardinality predicates.
- Proportional. most, half, two-thirds, ten percent, the majority — compare cardinalities of A∩B and A−B.
- Vague / context-dependent. many, few, several, a lot, hardly any — sensitive to context-set, expectations, and comparison classes.
- Definite / specific. the, this, that, these, those — analyzed as quantifiers in some frameworks (Russell 1905, Strawson 1950, Heim 1982).
- Possessive. John's, my, every student's — quantify over a possession relation.
- Generic. Bare plurals and the singular generic — "dogs bark," "a dog barks" — quantify over normal individuals or kinds (Carlson 1977, Krifka et al. 1995).
Cross-linguistic patterns
- English. Det-N order; rich proportional system (most, majority, the bulk of); strong Quantifier Raising for inverse scope.
- Mandarin. No definite article; classifier-based quantification (三本书 sān běn shū "three CL book"); strong surface-scope preference. Mandarin lacks a direct lexicalization of most; speakers use 大多数 dàduōshù ("great-majority") or 多半 duōbàn ("more-than-half").
- Japanese. Floating quantifiers (学生が三人来た gakusei-ga san-nin kita "students three-CL came") — the quantifier appears separated from the noun. Strong surface-scope; Japanese inverse readings are rare and pragmatically marked (Kuroda 1971).
- German. Quantifiers carry case agreement; scope is fairly fixed by surface order (more rigid than English).
- Pirahã. Famously claimed (Everett 2005) to lack proportional quantifiers entirely — the only quantifier-like terms are something like "a small amount" and "a large amount." The claim is contested but a useful boundary case for the typology.
- Hungarian. Strict left-to-right scope determined by syntactic position; no Quantifier Raising. Hungarian is the textbook case for surface-scope languages.
Worked example: scope ambiguity
Consider:
Every student read a book.
Two readings:
- Surface scope (∀ > ∃): ∀x. STUDENT(x) → ∃y. BOOK(y) ∧ READ(x, y). Each student read some book or other; possibly different books.
- Inverse scope (∃ > ∀): ∃y. BOOK(y) ∧ ∀x. STUDENT(x) → READ(x, y). There is one specific book that every student read.
In Generalized Quantifier Theory the two readings correspond to two different orders of function application — the indefinite scoping over the universal, or vice versa. May (1985) introduced Quantifier Raising (QR), an LF-level movement operation that adjoins a quantifier phrase to a sentential node, deriving the inverse reading from the same surface structure.
Languages differ in QR availability:
English ∀>∃ and ∃>∀ both available, ambiguous
Mandarin ∀>∃ strongly preferred (Aoun & Li 1989)
Japanese ∀>∃ strongly preferred
German roughly surface-only
Hungarian surface-only — no QR
Other quantificational phenomena
- Donkey anaphora. "Every farmer who owns a donkey beats it" — the indefinite a donkey behaves like a universal in scope, motivating Discourse Representation Theory (Kamp 1981) and File Change Semantics (Heim 1982).
- Cumulative readings. "Three professors taught five courses" can mean a total of 3 professors and 5 courses with arbitrary pairings — neither pure ∀>∃ nor ∃>∀.
- Polyadic quantifiers. "Different students read different books" — quantifiers that don't decompose into iterated monadic ones (van Benthem 1989, Keenan 1992).
- Choice functions. Reinhart (1997) — wide-scope existentials over indefinites are analyzed as choice functions, sidestepping standard scope mechanisms.
- Q-particles. Some languages mark question-quantifier scope morphologically — Japanese -ka, Sinhala -da, Tlingit -sá.
- Numeral classifiers. Mandarin, Japanese, Korean, Vietnamese require a classifier between numeral and noun (三本书 sān běn shū). Treated semantically as part of the quantification structure (Chierchia 1998).
Common pitfalls
- Treating most as "more than half." Closer than "many," but not identical — "most" usually implies a clear majority, not a 51% one. Hackl (2009) gives experimental evidence the lexical entry is > half; pragmatic strengthening adds the "clear" flavor.
- Confusing any with every. NPI any needs a downward-entailing context; free-choice any in modal contexts is universal-flavored. Two distinct lexical items, often conflated.
- Assuming all languages have proportional quantifiers. Not all do — Pirahã is the famous edge case; many others lack a direct lexicalization of most.
- Reading scope off surface order. English allows inverse scope freely; Mandarin and Japanese typically don't. Cross-linguistic predictions matter.
- Forgetting conservativity. If you propose a new determiner, check whether only the restrictor matters — non-conservative entries are nearly impossible to find in natural language.
- Conflating all and every. "All students passed" allows collective readings; "every student passed" forces distributive (each one). The difference shows up in "all students gathered" ✓ vs "every student gathered" ✗.
Frequently asked questions
Why can't first-order logic express "most"?
First-order logic only has ∀ (every) and ∃ (some); other quantifiers must be expressed by combinations. "Most students passed" cannot be reduced to first-order formulas because proportionality requires comparing the cardinality of two sets — |students ∩ passed| > |students − passed|. This is a second-order property. Barwise and Cooper (1981) showed natural language uses many such non-first-order quantifiers (most, half, few, many), motivating Generalized Quantifier Theory which treats quantifiers as relations between sets rather than as logical primitives.
What is conservativity?
A property that nearly all natural-language determiners share: Q(A, B) is equivalent to Q(A, A ∩ B) — only the A-individuals matter for the truth of the quantification. "Every dog barks" depends only on what dogs do; non-dogs are irrelevant, even if some non-dogs bark. Formally, Q is conservative if Q(A, B) ↔ Q(A, A ∩ B). Keenan and Stavi (1986) showed that all extensional natural-language determiners are conservative — a striking universal, since logical possibility allows non-conservative quantifiers (e.g., "only," sometimes argued to be quasi-conservative on a different argument).
What is monotonicity, and why does it matter?
Monotonicity describes how a quantifier preserves entailment under set substitution. "Every student walked" entails "every student moved" (walking ⊂ moving) — every is upward-monotone in its second argument. "Every student walked" entails "every freshman walked" (freshman ⊂ student) — every is downward-monotone in its first argument. Monotonicity predicts where Negative Polarity Items (any, ever, lift a finger) are licensed: only in downward-entailing environments. "Nobody ever called" is fine (nobody is downward-entailing); "Somebody ever called" is not.
What's a Generalized Quantifier?
A Generalized Quantifier is a relation between sets, or equivalently a set of sets. "Every dog" denotes the set of all sets that include every dog — i.e., {X : DOG ⊆ X}. "Most dogs" denotes the set of all sets X such that |DOG ∩ X| > |DOG − X|. "Three dogs" denotes {X : |DOG ∩ X| ≥ 3}. This higher-order treatment, due to Mostowski (1957) and Lindström (1966), and applied to natural language by Barwise and Cooper (1981), uniformly handles quantifiers of all kinds — logical, cardinal, proportional, and vague.
What's the difference between restricted and unrestricted quantification?
Restricted quantification specifies a domain via a noun phrase — "every student passed" restricts ranging to students. Unrestricted quantification ranges over the whole universe — "everyone is happy" or first-order ∀x.HAPPY(x). Natural language is overwhelmingly restricted; first-order logic is overwhelmingly unrestricted. Generalized Quantifier Theory makes restriction explicit: every is a function from a set (the restrictor) to a relation between that set and another (the nuclear scope). The noun supplies the restrictor; the predicate supplies the scope.
Are quantifier scopes ambiguous?
Yes. "Every student read a book" has two readings. Surface-scope: ∀x.STUDENT(x) → ∃y.BOOK(y) ∧ READ(x, y) — each student read some book or other (different books possible). Inverse-scope: ∃y.BOOK(y) ∧ ∀x.STUDENT(x) → READ(x, y) — there is one specific book that every student read. Languages differ in scope flexibility: English allows both fairly readily; Mandarin, Japanese, and German strongly prefer surface scope (Aoun and Li 1989, Kuroda 1971). Quantifier Raising (May 1985) is the standard syntactic mechanism for inverse readings.